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ABSTRACT 
Uncertainty is an inherent feature of strategies to contain animal disease. In 
this paper an interdisciplinary framework for representing strategies of 
containment, and analysing how uncertainties are embedded and 
propagated through them, is developed and illustrated.  Analysis centres on 
persistent, periodic and emerging disease threats, with a particular focus on 
Cryptosporidium, Foot & Mouth Disease and Avian Influenza.  Uncertainty is 
shown to be produced at strategic, tactical and operational levels of 
containment, and across the different arenas of disease prevention, 
anticipation and alleviation. The paper argues for more critically reflexive 
assessments of uncertainty in containment policy and practice.  An 
interdisciplinary approach has an important contribution to make, but is 
absent from current real world containment policy. 
Keywords:  animal disease; containment; uncertainty; policy; 
interdisciplinarity.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines uncertainties associated with strategies to contain 
animal disease. In general terms, uncertainty analysis is a way of assessing, 
to varying degrees of statistical and analytical precision, limits to reasoning 
and understanding1, 2 .  Uncertainty is an inherent and inescapable attribute 
of decision making processes that aim to prevent, anticipate and alleviate 
animal disease. Encompassing a range of procedures and priorities, 
governance arrangements for containment are both institutionally and 
scientifically complex. The extensive, open and highly unstructured character 
of disease threats means that interventions come with few guarantees.  
A range of techniques, originating from within the sciences, are available 
to decision makers to explain the character and significance of uncertainty 
across different aspects of disease containment. These include, for instance, 
probabilistic and qualitative assessments of emerging threats, outbreak 
behaviour and the efficacy of mitigation measures. In principle, therefore, 
uncertainly analysis is a way of informing decision makers about the extent 
to which particular outcomes can be inferred from available knowledge, 
hedged by cautions against unrealistic aspirations for science within 
procedurally rational decision making.  
Important though these techniques are, they cannot reveal how and why 
uncertainties come to be embedded in the policy and practice of 
containment, and indeed, what role institutional arrangements for animal 
disease governance may play in perpetrating them.  An understanding of 
these issues requires a much broader treatment of the priorities and 
functions of containment systems and how scientific, and other forms of 
knowledge, are viewed, interpreted and deployed in relation to them.  This 
paper provides a framework for such an approach.  It examines how and 
why uncertainties emerge in the arenas of disease prevention, surveillance 
and control and examines their strategic, tactical and operational 
expressions.  
The origins of this paper are in interdisciplinary research.    Its insights 
arise from an initial analysis of expert interviews, policy documentation and 
scientific evidence from a three year study of uncertainties in animal disease 
containment, undertaken by a research team of veterinary scientists, 
sociologists, biologists, geographers and political scientists. The general 
framework we develop emerged from a process of group discussion and 
learning between researchers working from different theoretical and 
empirical starting points: examining the procedures and assumptions that 
guide recognition of uncertainty in natural scientific terms and assessing the 
institutional context and circumstances in which knowledge is created and 
deployed for particular containment ends. The framework is not designed to 
encompass all aspects of uncertainty analysis in disease containment, but 
rather to function as a heuristic for thinking about uncertainty in an 
integrated and cross-disciplinary way.  
The framework is illustrated primarily by reference to three animal 
diseases: Cryptosporidium, Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) and Avian 
Influenza (AI).  Each exemplifies different epidemiological characteristics in a 
UK context: Cryptosporidium is endemic and zoonotic; FMD is exotic, 
notifiable and non-zoonotic; AI is notifiable, exotic, newly emerging and 
potentially zoonotic. Each differs markedly from the others in terms of 
pathogenicity, rates of evolution and transmission routes. The governance 
arrangements for containment of each are distinct. However, in this paper 
we aim to develop a framework  designed to identify generic - cross disease 
- parameters for the analysis of uncertainty in containment practice.  
The paper begins by presenting a general conceptualisation of strategies 
of containment and their associated uncertainties. An overview of the key 
theoretical terms related to uncertainty analysis is then provided, drawing on 
examples from each of the diseases.  Using this framework a detailed 
analysis of the uncertainties associated with strategies of containment is 
developed and illustrated in the context of three key arenas of practice: 
prevention, anticipation and alleviation. The paper concludes by highlighting 
practical learning responses from this analysis for policy development and 
the related role of interdisciplinary research. 
2. STRATEGIES FOR CONTAINING ANIMAL DISEASE:  GENERAL 
CONCEPTUALISATION 
In this paper containment is interpreted broadly. It is taken to encompass 
the whole cycle of disease containment, from issues of prevention and 
surveillance to those of recovery and control.  Alongside issues of disease 
morbidity and mortality in non-human populations, containment is also 
understood to incorporate the wider zoonotic and non-zoonotic burdens of 
animal disease, including human livelihoods, health and well being, and 
more generally, political and institutional capabilities and reputations.  In 
particular our conceptualisation encompasses three key arenas of action:  
• Prevention: or reducing the occurrence of animal disease. The focus 
here is on taking pre-emptive forms of action that reduce the chances 
of a disease outbreak, such as regulating zoosanitary practices on 
farms, investing in new technical infrastructures to limit disease 
transmission within livestock populations, or changing livestock 
management practices. 
• Anticipation:  or acknowledging a potential animal disease threat and 
predicting and preparing for disease outbreaks.  This arena of practice 
includes building capacities to identify failures of prevention through 
earliest possible disease surveillance.  It also encompasses 
experimental modelling of disease scenarios and the design and 
testing of contingency planning arrangements. 
• Alleviation: or the process of responding to disease-occurrence. The 
focus here is on the procedures adopted to control and eradicate 
disease in real world circumstances.  This includes associated technical 
functions such as modelling and projecting outbreak behaviour and 
restricting the wider burdens and legacies of disease, such as 
managing the long term repercussions of outbreaks for affected 
individuals and communities. 
Furthermore, our conceptualisation is designed to recognise that each of 
these strategies have different forms of expression according to the level of 
policy practice. In particular we distinguish between: 
• The strategic level: structures and processes that directly or indirectly 
shape underpinning principles of containment. This can include policy 
activities and networks with formal responsibilities to produce these 
strategies, also includes the political, economic, regulatory 
arrangements prescribing the scope, ambition and remit of 
containment practice.  The use of legislation to mandate stakeholders 
to act on disease risks, such as the continuous sampling of oocysts in 
the UK under the 1999 Cryptosporidium Regulations, or to extend 
state powers to act on disease, such as the preventative and control 
powers under the UK’s Avian Influenza Order 2006, would be example 
of a high level strategic process. 
• The tactical level:  where strategic level goals are translated into 
practical rules, procedures and tools for decision making. Tactical level 
activities are essentially a context in which underpinning rationales for 
containment are given procedural expression. For instance, making 
decisions regarding how water should in practice be monitored, such 
as the design of sampling arrangements, or use of particular types of 
technical instrument, is an example of a tactical process.  Another is 
the development of criteria for intervening in AI disease outbreaks, 
such as the creation of surveillance protection zones, or the design of 
preventative measures, such as compulsory registration of poultry 
owners. 
• The operational level:  practical contexts of disease containment, in all 
their variety. Operational level activities are variegated systems of 
technological and human practice. In principle they should be the 
outcomes/repercussions of strategic decisions for containment and the 
practical expression of tactic. Examples of operational practices include 
activities in diagnostic laboratories, the process of vaccinating birds or 
livestock, the implementation of biosecurity measures at livestock 
markets, or the technical process of providing and handling water 
samples.  
The generalised nature of this conceptualisation should be emphasised. 
Making the analytical distinction between ‘arenas’ and ‘levels’, for instance, 
is likely to be readily identifiable to policy and decision makers, and indeed, 
is sufficiently generic to be relevant to both different categories of animal 
disease, for instance, endemic and exotic, and different spatial and temporal 
scales of containment, such as a localised outbreak of Cryptosporidiosis or a 
national outbreak of FMD. A visualisation of these dimensions of 
containment, and how they interact, is provided in Figure 1, taking the 
example of AI.   
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It is by following the interactions between these arenas and levels that 
many of the uncertainties associated with strategies of containment can be 
identified and accounted for.    First, uncertainty may be situated within a 
particular level/arena. For example, at the operational level of anticipation 
veterinary practitioners may fail to recognise clinical signs in animals 
affected by FMD.. Second, uncertainties may emerge as we move between 
different levels of policy practice. For example tactics may be ignored, 
circumnavigated or misunderstood at the operational level, such as moving 
animals when restrictions are in place.  Third, uncertainties may emerge as 
we move between different arenas of the containment cycle, such as 
uncertainties of alleviation being amplified because of delays in disease 
notification; that is, because of failures of anticipation. 
In the following sections of the paper we provide a non exhaustive 
treatment of these dimensions of uncertainty. To begin approaching this task 
we provide an overview of the different ways uncertainty can be interpreted, 
drawing on simple illustrations from each of the case study diseases. 
3. UNCERTAINTY: GENERAL THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS   
A range of taxonomies and accounts of uncertainty have emerged within the 
scientific and social scientific literature1,3,4,5 (Figure 2). A common theoretical 
proposition of this work is that uncertainties can be distinguished according 
to the degree which reasoning about a given problem or issue departs from 
a de facto scientific ideal of determinate (i.e. certain) knowledge.  Thus, in 
the context of infectious disease we know in the most general sense that 
agents including viruses, bacteria and parasites cause disease when they 
come into contact with a suitable host; but it is not certain that they will 
cause disease in every case. This may be due to a range of factors 
characteristic of both the host and the pathogen such as natural or acquired 
immunity, genetic variability, and so on. 
An important distinction within uncertainty analysis concerns whether an 
uncertainty can be expressed in probabilistic terms, that is, where frequency 
distributions can be inferred for a known set of outcomes.  Probabilistic 
uncertainty is sometimes referred to as ‘statistical uncertainty’ or ‘weak 
uncertainty’, but most commonly, ‘risk’.   There are numerous examples in 
disease of factors which lend themselves to some form of probabilistic 
treatment. So, for example, in the case of Cryptosporidium it is possible to 
calculate a theoretical risk of exposure posed by drinking a glass of 
contaminated water, provided we know basic parameters such as how many 
oocysts per litre are present in the water supplied, their viability and the 
volume of water in the glass.   
This type of uncertainty can be contrasted with situations in which a range 
of possible outcomes are known, but probabilities are not.  Here, decision 
making proceeds on the basis of broader approximations and best guesses. 
This latter type of uncertainty is sometimes referred to as ‘strong 
uncertainty’, ‘scenario uncertainty’, but most commonly, simply 
‘uncertainty’.  For instance, during an outbreak of FMD policy makers may 
reasonably ask:  “how long will this disease outbreak last?”; or in the case of 
an outbreak of avian influenza, “what is the risk of the emergence of 
zoonotic genotypes?”  Researchers may not be able to respond to these 
questions in probabilistic terms but experience may grant them some 
understanding or ‘sense‘ for the types of outcomes more or less likely to 
occur. 
Importantly, both ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ uncertainty may be driven by 
assumptions that may be exposed as fallible by way of surprising and 
unanticipated results.  In other words, there may be unrecognised 
shortcomings in the capacity of available knowledge to identify outcomes, or 
describe systems effectively, regardless of whether they can be expressed 
probabilistically. This form of unrecognized uncertainty is commonly termed 
‘ignorance’. So for example when the first cases of Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy (BSE) in UK cattle arose, former unquestioned assumptions 
were broken by the emergence of a new paradigm by which an infectious 
disease could be spread in the food chain independently of viruses, bacteria 
or parasites. Only when the role of prion disease became better understood 
was it possible to re-engage probabilistic assessments in the building of 
animal and public health policies with respect to transmissible spongiform 
encephalopathies. 
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 Risk’, ‘uncertainty’ and ‘ignorance’ may elicit two types of 
reaction/response.  First, they may be thought to reflect practical failures in 
the way information is acquired (such as measurement uncertainty, due to 
sampling errors, inaccuracy or imprecision).  These are often collectively 
referred to as epistemic or reducible uncertainties; the assumption being 
that, by overcoming shortcomings  in technique and method, risk will be 
better represented and controlled,  uncertainty will narrow, and ignorance 
diminish (i.e. systems will become more determinate).   For example, an 
epistemic practice in disease containment would be to improve methods of 
surveillance, such as endeavouring to reduce human errors in oocyst 
identification in water treatment works as the basis for improving detection 
rates for Cryptosporidium. Another would be improving calibration 
methodologies within epidemiological modelling to validate further the 
trajectories of hypothetical FMD and AI outbreaks.   Second, these risks, 
uncertainties and ignorances   may be assumed to be the product of systems 
that exceed scientific capacities to rationalise them. These are often 
collectively referred to as ontological or irreducible uncertainties. The 
dynamics of weather patterns and its influence on airborne transmissions of 
FMD would be an example of indeterminacy.  Indeterminacy emphasises that 
causal chains and networks of complex social and technological systems, 
such as disease containment, are often open, emergent and highly context 
specific, and therefore persistently defy prediction and control (i.e. systems 
are indeterminate).  In practical terms it is an idea closely associated with 
the arguments for adaptive management; that is, approaches to disease 
control that are responsive to local contingencies and changing conditions.  
 Both ontological uncertainty and epistemic uncertainty have an ethical 
dimension as well 6, opening up science and policy to deeper philosophical 
uncertainties of principle and conduct. Ontological uncertainty raises the 
questions: what do we seek to achieve and why? For instance, what 
priorities should dictate the policy significance of disease, and accompanying 
commitments of resource to containment systems?  On what basis do we 
assign relative significance to AI, FMD and Cryptosporidium, and more 
broadly, to biological risks over other potential sources of harm: radiological, 
chemical and so forth? The answers to these questions are less than clear 
cut. Epistemic uncertainty, in turn, raises further questions: in particular, 
how do we arbitrate on the fairness of a potential intervention when faced 
with contingent knowledge, scientific or otherwise, and a range of known 
and unknown outcomes, and where it is inevitable that there will be both 
winners and losers?  
Often these questions are interpreted through technocratic processes, 
such as policy appraisal and regulatory impact assessment in government, 
where the costs and benefits of action are assessed. A useful example of this 
type of approach to reasoning would be the use of numerical scoring and 
weighting procedures to rank diseases against different criteria of 
significance7 and thereby establish priorities for resource allocation.   In the 
UK, for instance, this approach is used by the responsible government 
department as part of its disease prioritisation. It has assessed diseases on 
the basis of 39 different criteria, each assigned varying importance within 
the overall scoring scheme, and spanning such epidemiological, economic 
and institutional questions as public health and animal welfare, 
consequences for industry and economy, the scale of government effort 
involved, as well as legal obligations and ramifications8. 
At the practical level of assessment, these methodologies are uncertain 
because they typically produce judgments of overall disease importance by 
blending together available scientific evidence with surrogate - expert 
informed – datasets. The latter are employed in (the many) situations where 
scientific understanding is weak, or indeed, entirely absent.  Indeed, as 
Krause9 shows in an overview of approaches taken in different national 
settings, elicitation involves methodologies for collecting ‘opinion’ - usually 
by way of survey and group techniques.  However, the general point is that 
the composite and numerical nature of the scoring process creates an 
illusion of confidence about priorities where irreducible uncertainties and 
contingencies may actually be in play.  This applies even where judgments 
appear to be based on competent scientific knowledge, since any given 
criterion in the prioritisation process is itself open to different types of 
interpretation. Take for instance, the criterion of ‘severity’ as a marker of 
significance, and consider this in relation to the diarrhoeal disease of 
Cryptosporidiosis.  As one interviewee in our research suggested, official 
medical literature persistently characterises this as a “mild self-limiting 
illness”, but: “if you spoke to someone who had had clinical 
Cryptosporidiosis ...[ ]... and said ‘you have got a mild illness’, they would 
slap you because people can get very poorly”.   In other words, these 
approaches are based on a pragmatic calculus that often belies the deeper 
ethical complexity of policy choices.   
4. UNCERTAINTIES OF PREVENTION  
In this section we consider how uncertainties are embedded in the strategic, 
tactical and operational dimensions of prevention. By definition preventive 
measures extend patterns of innovation and action in disease containment 
beyond that of preparedness and control. At an operational level these 
measures may be applied at a variety of spatial scales, such as promoting 
zoosanitary practices on farms to mitigate the emergence of AI or FMD or 
instituting barrier controls, such as import control measures, at the national 
level. Part of the strategic reasoning behind the use of preventive measures 
is that they reduce resource burdens felt elsewhere in the containment 
cycle. In many, but by no means all cases, costs associated with alleviation 
and recovery will be orders of magnitude higher than investments in 
preventative measures.  Relatedly, because prevention extends patterns of 
knowledge acquisition, innovation and action beyond the issue of post 
outbreak measures alone, new communities of interest in animal disease 
containment may be revealed, and overall costs and responsibilities of 
containment therefore further diffused. 
While commitments to prevention are a logical aspiration for policy and 
decision makers it does not follow that prevention ensures that containment 
systems are more resilient to disease outbreaks.  The reverse may actually 
be the case if the preventive tactics employed are too simplistic, such as 
those that apply measures at a single operational level (for instance, import 
controls only) or are undertaken to the neglect of developing other facets of 
the containment system (such as the preparation of contingency plans).   
The recent emergence of biosecurity as a strategic and organising agenda 
to prevent the introduction and spread of disease agents is a good example 
of an unfolding interest in animal disease prevention, one that has found 
currency at international10 and national levels11. This has resulted in a range 
of tactical measures – mandatory and voluntary – to cultivate preventive 
attitudes, behaviours and responsibilities at the operational level.  In the UK, 
for instance, biosecurity has been promoted as matter of routine good 
practice on farms by government through a recent ‘Give Disease the Boot 
Campaign’ and accompanying advice networks12 . It has also been instituted 
into Farm Health Planning in the UK, a set of tactical initiatives designed to 
promote and foster good practice in managing livestock health and welfare 
risks.  
Preventive measures create new possibilities for scientific innovation and 
research within containment, but science often struggles to determine 
measurable operational ‘outcomes’ as increasingly demanded by audit 
cultures in policy.  Prevention can therefore remain elusive to objective 
standard-setting, but these uncertainties are institutionalised into 
containment practice because often they arise out of political, rather than 
scientific, forms of calculation.  As Donaldson13 explains, in the case of the 
UK biosecurity emerged as a public policy term at the height of the 2001 
FMD outbreak and as a way of explaining practical measures that could be 
deployed to alleviate disease spread at the farm level.  It was invented to 
govern and describe appropriate operational conduct, and failings therein, 
during crisis.  Part of his argument is that biosecurity has had to be placed 
on a scientific footing post hoc.   
A useful example of the type of problems scientists face in measuring and 
thereby rendering accountable the efficacy of preventive processes is 
provided in Cryptosporidium management. Here a range of upstream land, 
manure and livestock management options, implying varying degrees of 
capital investment, income foregone, and of practical competence on the 
part of land managers, are emerging as a means of minimising potential 
outbreaks of Cryptosporidiosis among water consumers14.  This may include 
employing biosecurity practices on farms (such as cleaning and disinfection) 
as well as undertaking more fundamental changes to the farm system, such 
as investing in new technical infrastructures to limit disease transmission 
within livestock populations, and changing patterns of livestock 
management.  
There is a good understanding of the biological variables controlling these 
systems, but not how they interact especially with human social variables to 
allow reliable assessment, with probabilistic confidence, of the relationship 
between measures and risks in any given practical context15.  Source 
tracking technologies, for instance, are rarely employed in real world 
settings as an active preventive practice, and are operationally difficult even 
in experimental terms16. Moreover, this science is being applied further away 
from measurable human health outcomes.  While measures to prevent 
Cryptosporidium in livestock may well reduce incidences of Cryptosporidiosis 
in humans, intervening variables and steps in the containment process (for 
instance, raw water treatment) make these relationships impossible to align, 
and account for, precisely.  
 In any case, scientific uncertainty in measuring the efficacy of these 
practical initiatives is itself embedded in a less-than-perfect world of 
operational practice.  For example, the practical viability of any given 
measure depends on individuals possessing, and deploying skills, in ways 
concurrent with an effective scientific measure, but this cannot be assured.  
Informal and self-organising networks of knowledge-exchange, for instance 
among farmers17, is one way of ameliorating these problems operationally.  
Indeed, the practical cost of systematically enforcing measures, or simply 
providing advice, involves the law of diminishing returns:  required efforts 
may simply outweigh the level of perceived risk.   
5. UNCERTAINTIES OF ANTICIPATION 
Anticipatory containment is about recognising and planning for potential 
disease outbreaks.  Its broad purpose is to cultivate systems that can 
respond to disease threats in a timely fashion.  
A significant aspect of anticipation is the development of disease 
monitoring systems that embed localized surveillance into national, and 
ultimately international, assessments of disease emergence. However, 
comparative national standards for surveillance are highly varied, from real 
time disease control and prevention to cumbersome manual procedures with 
a high capacity for human error18.  Even within well resourced systems, 
information of use to surveillance may not be integrated effectively at the 
tactical and operational levels. For example a recent account of the UK 
Veterinary Surveillance Strategy by Lowe19 has pointed to national level 
surveillance of animal disease risks as disinclined to incorporate data from 
‘on the ground ‘clinical observations, such as from veterinarians and industry 
stakeholders, relying instead on laboratory testing and reporting 
arrangements.   
Furthermore, because surveillance data often passes through a range of 
monitoring and reporting stages patterns of disease emergence may be 
underestimated. Take, for example, reporting procedures surrounding 
Cryptosporidiosis.  In the UK, reporting of this disease depends on 
information transmission through a complex architecture of self-reporting, 
stool sampling, laboratory testing and notification.   Infections may remain 
undiagnosed because individuals choose not to report symptoms.  In turn, a 
general practitioner in the UK may not choose to take faecal samples so 
nothing would be reported to laboratory surveillance.  Not all hospital 
laboratories will test for Cryptosporidium, and where they do, there is no 
guarantee that all samples will be tested. Moreover, methods of detection 
typically involve the staining and microscopic examination of faecal 
specimens, but it has been suggested that this fails to detect about half of 
all Cryptosporidium infections20.   
 In this particular case, general technological innovations in containment 
practice could change case-ascertainments significantly. For example, 
molecular techniques in laboratory testing , would increase reported rates of 
infection, while technological innovations in water monitoring, such as the 
use of real time Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) amplification of DNA, 
could improve rates of detection, thereby enhancing overall system 
preparedness.  Yet not only would such innovations imply commitments of 
resource, they depend on readiness for uptake.  For Cryptosporidium, 
though, it is questionable whether water industries would readily innovate in 
systems that are producing low detection rates in treated water.   
An important further point of note about anticipation is that surveillance 
systems inevitably reflect a restricted body of knowledge on disease 
behaviour and therefore may be fundamentally ignorant of emergent risks.  
This may be unimportant where the risks are relatively low. For instance, in 
2008, a previously unrecognised Cryptosporidium rabbit genotype was linked 
to an outbreak of Cryptosporidiosis in Northamptonshire, UK and this has 
been incorporated in to existing containment practices as a potential low 
level, background threat21.  In other instances, the consequences of 
ignorance can be more paradigmatic. The recent emergence of Influenza A 
(H1N1) virus – ‘swine flu’ - is a good example, as was the emergence of the 
neurodegenerative disease BSE in cattle in the 1980s and the variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) in humans.  In these circumstances of 
revealed ignorance and surprise, institutional ability to recognise and adapt 
becomes paramount as the new disease scenario unfolds. For instance, the 
emergence of H1N1 brings the potential for recombination with highly 
pathogenic AI (H5N1) and the development of new, and more virulent, 
strains with a wider host range.  New - often hybrid - platforms for 
anticipatory research therefore begin to emerge as ex ante priorities are 
reassessed. 
While strategic level prioritisation regularly seeks to update priorities (i.e. 
tactics) on the basis of research and intelligence precisely to avoid this 
ignorance of system change within anticipatory arenas, the point still holds 
that emergent conditions for disease can pass entirely unrecognised, until 
they have gone past tipping points. This is as true for ostensibly ‘known’ 
diseases as it for system ‘surprises’. Take for instance, changing attitudes to 
FMD in the UK.  It is now widely recognised that the intensification and 
concentration of market systems for livestock in the years preceding the 
2001 outbreak had not only exposed the UK system to greater unnoticed 
risk of disease-emergence, but by orders of magnitude higher than for 
previous crises.  However, these systemic and gradual developments took 
place during an extended ‘disease-free’ period in the UK.  Not only did the 
visibility of the disease within political, public and expert discourses tacitly 
wane22, but institutions and society ‘forgot’ the necessary skills and 
capacities needed to identify and cope with a future outbreak23 .   
In principle, randomised surveillance would be one means by which 
system ignorance may be engaged with proactively, and at the same time, 
allowing the prevalence of known disease threats to be rechecked. However, 
what constitutes effective randomised surveillance in biological terms is itself 
unclear, and may in any case be implausible on the wider grounds of 
proportionality, not least the costs entailed.   
To some extent, uncertainties in disease identification may be anticipated 
through systems of quality audit and control.  In these cases anticipation is 
more effective because the system is already predicated on uncertainty.   
Technological systems for surveillance and the sampling methodologies that 
accompany them may, for example, observe risks at one step removed from 
disease occurrence, such as through the use of ‘indicator organisms’ to 
demonstrate potential pathogenic presences in waterborne disease.  For 
example, faecal indicator organisms (FIOs) such as generic E. coli are used 
in water quality assessment as an ‘indicator’ of the ingress of 
sewage/wastewater into drinking water. But FIOs are not themselves a 
significant health hazard; rather they suggest the potential presence of 
pathogenic microorganisms (whether bacterial, protozoan or viral). Debates 
consequently prevail on the validity of some FIOs as surrogates for bacterial, 
protozoan and viral pathogens24 but many regulatory bodies across the 
world currently use these indicators to monitor microbial water quality.   
Even if we were to accept that what is being monitored may lead to 
disease, acting on this information to protect human health may be impeded 
by the context in which information is interpreted. Consider again 
Cryptosporidium in the UK.  Until recently it was the privatized water 
industry working in the context of water quality standards (i.e. arenas of 
prevention and anticipation), rather than public health outcomes (i.e. arenas 
of alleviation and recovery) that defined priorities for a significant area of the 
containment system. Yet, although water quality standards may be used as 
analogues for public health outcomes, they are not substitutes.  For 
example, before 2008 water industry regulations stipulated that, on average, 
no more than one oocyst per 10 litres of water sampled was allowable in 
treated water.  However, under this system oocysts could be detected above 
the threshold but not necessarily result in a disease outbreak; just as 
detection below this threshold could lead to disease despite being 
permissible. Partly for this reason these Cryptosporidium monitoring 
requirements were revoked, requiring the water industry to create ‘Water 
Safety Plans’ in which comprehensive risk assessments are undertaken, 
thereby aligning priorities more directly to health outcomes. 
Anticipation and preparedness also encompass basic and applied scientific 
research into disease behaviour under future outbreak scenarios. In this vein 
there is an emerging tradition of tactical research simulating animal diseases 
using modelling techniques, such as examining the propagation of H5N1 
within the British poultry industry 25,26, 27 and FMD in the livestock sector28,29.  
These approaches provide contexts in which policy options for disease 
control and risk assessment can be built into system preparedness, though 
from experience they are often poor decision making tools for disease 
alleviation (see below).  Perhaps not surprisingly the specification and 
parameterization of these models, and their accompanying evidence base, 
has often been identified as highly uncertain30,31. Parameter estimation, an 
essential part of model development, is frequently based on data considered 
to be comparable to the system under study, whilst clearly being different. 
For example, because of the paucity of data specific for H5N1 transmission 
in the UK, models have relied upon extrapolation from other infectious 
agents, including those as different as bacteria25. Further, these models 
attempt to provide detailed representations of the potential transmission 
contacts between explicitly located populations of poultry (e.g. farms). 
However, such models are, by definition, incomplete and highly simplified 
system representations, and the requisite parameter values and data are 
uncertain.   
An important related element of model building is therefore model 
evaluation, and in particular, the use of sensitivity analysis (where 
parameter values are varied across what is considered to be a plausible 
range).  This can be used to explore ‘parameter space’ i.e. plausible values 
given current knowledge.  However, what is less commonly acknowledged is 
the impact of model specification itself, including on the interpretation of 
model sensitivity analysis. Hence, if a model is insensitive to variation in 
a particular parameter, it may be assumed that more detailed knowledge of 
this parameter is not needed; but it is not usually acknowledged that this 
inference relates only to the model in question, rather than some 
fundamental ‘reality’. Thus, there are important domains of usually unstated 
scientific ignorance which underlie policy and may compromise its 
robustness. An important point here is that decisions regarding model 
specification themselves inevitably reflect a restricted body of knowledge 
and represent judgements on what aspects should be included or excluded.  
Relatedly, the research underpinning this paper is revealing the dilemmas 
faced by scientists when putting models into the policy domain of animal 
disease. As one put it, there is a prevailing perception among policy makers 
that models are “some kind of forecast …[like]…weather forecasts…[and]… 
econom[ic] forecasts…[ ]…And somehow that they’re including everything”. 
And yet, as this respondent put it, for a scientist working in these applied 
worlds of animal disease policy:  
“it’s very dangerous to say you don’t believe this model before you start.  
It’s quite a hard trick to pull off to convince the policymaker that the 
model has value and should be believed and they should base their policy 
on it, and at the same time explain that actually the model, it’s not true, is 
wrong.” 
Modellers working on animal disease were, it was suggested, “engineers” of 
the model – and thereby attentive to model faults - but simultaneously 
“salespeople” wanting their work to assert influence on the consumer (i.e. 
policy users).   It is hardly a novel observation within academic discourse to 
suggest that the value of model building lays as much in its capacity to 
assist ‘learning about’ uncertainty as it does to serve the creation of 
‘predictive truth-machines’32. However the placement of highly experimental 
epidemiological modelling research within policy development often 
presumes the latter. As it was put by one respondent in our study “as far as 
[policy customers] are concerned you know, these models are reality in a 
computer which you turn the handle and it tells you what’s going to 
happen”. 
6. UNCERTAINTIES OF ALLEVIATION 
A key uncertainty governing alleviation processes surrounds issues of 
purpose: what is it we seek to achieve and why? This is not only a matter for 
policy commitment, but also affects related knowledge development and 
selection. The answer to these questions is often ambiguous.  In a purely 
epidemiological sense, aspirations for containment may be expressed around 
commitments to reduce or eradicate disease.  Yet this concern invariably 
accompanies  a range of other needs: for minimal duration; to restrict 
burdens on industries and communities; to maintain trust in institutions; to 
minimise over-reaction; to be cost efficient; to share responsibility; to be 
humane; and so forth.  In other words, disease-containment is not reducible 
to a single notion of purpose or effective outcome, nor by implication, to a 
single criterion against which uncertainties may be judged. 
At the highest levels of strategic political discourse this tension is in play. 
For instance the UK Government plan for managing exotic animal disease33 
describes, with great procedural exactness, the strategic, tactical and 
operational roles of organisations and individuals during outbreak scenarios. 
But it contains inherent conflicts within it regarding what the containment 
process is trying to achieve.  It suggests in one respect that, “[t]he 
Government’s first objective in tackling outbreaks …[ ]… is to restore the 
UK’s disease free status as quickly as possible”. Yet it also states that it 
intends to “[c]ause the least possible disruption to the food, farming and 
tourism industries, to visitors to the countryside, and to rural communities in 
the wider economy”. These wider aims are, of course, in direct conflict to 
achieving the first objective, but this conflict is neither resolved, nor even 
substantially addressed, in the document.  The implication is that these 
issues need to be – indeed, can only be - resolved in the specific context of a 
disease outbreak. 
The dimensions of this issue are different in the context of 
Cryptosporidium; in this case, alleviation of significant outbreak incidents is 
centred on the use of ‘boil water’ notices.  Here the priorities are to an 
extent clearer – the delivery of public health outcomes is overriding and 
paramount.  However, sustained ‘boil water’ notices are costly for industry 
and commerce and potentially damaging to consumer confidence in water 
supplies. A further complication is that the public health outcomes of 
alleviation are by no means clear. Not only does this containment strategy 
generate anxiety among publics, but it also has a further unintended health 
outcome, in that it increases the number of reported scalding incidents34.  
Thus there are potentially competing public health priorities. 
Alongside these uncertainties of purpose, it is the tactical and operational 
dimensions of science that are also significant to propagation of uncertainty 
within alleviation practice. In the context of AI and FMD, the use of 
modelling is again particularly important, with the predictive weakness of 
models tending to be exposed during crises. The use of ‘real-time’ modelling 
to inform and guide FMD disease control in the 2001 UK disease outbreak 
was a watershed in this respect35. Using either deterministic or stochastic 
techniques the models sought to build computer micro-simulations of the 
disease that could explain how it might transmit and progress through farms 
in space and time28,36,. It is in the relationship between the tactical and 
operational level of these modelling practices that uncertainties are exposed.  
For instance, in the course of our research, it has been argued by some 
scientists involved in the 2001 crisis that basic information on the 
transmission characteristics of the disease was limited. In this instance, 
expert opinion was used to inform the initial parameterisation of models:  
“[the]... data or knowledge out there was qualitative rather than 
quantitative and so what we tended to find was that a relatively small 
group of scientists worldwide had been working on FMD. They were the 
experts called upon historically to advise and control of the epidemic and 
they sort of had a kind of gut feeling of this; how it behaved and a lot of it 
wasn’t really quantified in any, sort of, rigorous way.”   
The wider literature on this crisis has noted that at the operational level 
detailed and accurate data on the spatial distribution of farms and livestock 
were not available to modellers.  Moreover all of the models avoided the use 
of important, if indeterminate, environmental variables relating to 
transmission by air, such as weather and topography. Models were highly 
insensitive to great variability in the susceptibility of farms to infection, not 
least in the context of the infectiousness of different livestock. Little 
credence was given to the behaviour of farmers in adopting biosecurity 
measures. Together with the imposition of the 3km/24-48 hr culling policy, 
these operational deficiencies in modelling – much more than the perceived 
problem of being unable to quantify qualitatively known processes, indeed 
almost the opposite of this, a masking of ignorance by excessive 
quantification - led to a process  described as ‘postcode slaughter’ or 
‘carnage by computer’. 37 As a result, the need has been emphasised to build 
governance structures that can enhance the efficacy and empirical realism of 
these scientific modelling practices for future outbreaks, and for more 
locally-adapted determinations of slaughter tactics otherwise defined 
nationally and in the abstract.  
Sociological evidence from the 2001 FMD crisis has provided analytical and 
qualitative insights into repercussions of the operational dimensions of the 
outbreak38,39, and in particular how strategic approaches to alleviation, 
wedded to epidemiological models, “lacked common sense and alienated and 
marginalized local knowledge”40 .  Local knowledge in this sense means 
bodies of expertise tied to the experience of disease in particular places and 
locales. It encompasses professional specialists occupying roles in  the 
public, private and third sectors (such as veterinarians, mental health 
workers,  teachers)  but also non professionalised (lay) forms of expertise 
(such as the practical ‘know-how’ farmers and land managers).  The 
proposition is that harnessing local understandings of the operational 
practice of animal disease alleviation may exposure higher level weakness in 
containment practices, such as those embedded in necessarily more 
synthetic scientific models often reflect.  Such knowledge is inevitably 
bounded by the particular circumstances of its production. It does not travel 
with great efficiency and often arrives in messy and unstructured forms. Yet 
it is precisely because local knowledge is so ‘situated’ that it is authoritative 
at the point of outbreak.  Strategic responsiveness to salient local knowledge 
is therefore important, though the emergent nature of this knowledge may 
mean it arrives too late to ameliorates weaknesses in tactics and strategy. 
There may be also fundamental mismatches between local and global 
understandings of an appropriate intervention, as Woolhouse (this edition) 
notes with regard to optimal culling rates in the 2001 FMD outbreak.    A 
more practically effective overall containment system has to find ways of 
combining these different kinds and sources of knowledge and authority 
about animal disease. The testing of contingency arrangements in 
anticipatory arena is one context for this.  In the UK for instance, simulated 
live exercises that rehearse the strategic, tactical and operational 
dimensions of alleviating outbreaks of exotic disease across of distributed set 
of stakeholders, is now being periodically conducted41. However a more 
general precondition for this constructive reconciliation of divergent 
expertise is prior recognition of these multivalent conditions of uncertainty in 
prevailing policy-authoritative scientific knowledge. 
8. CONCLUSIONS  
History offers plenty of high profile lessons where, during moments of crisis, 
the procedural rationality of decision making has been exposed as 
inadequate, and sometimes chronically unable to manage and mitigate 
disease occurrence in socially acceptable ways.  The language of public 
‘fear’, ‘dread’ and ‘panic’ which increasingly accompanies emergency 
situations in a range of fields, including animal diseases,  signals a deeper 
sense of  anxiety surrounding political and institutional capacities to cope, 
and thus by implication also, surrounding scientific advisory capacity to 
provide sound, practically-attuned knowledge.  Even where public anxieties 
are unfounded, there is a sense, during outbreak situations, that the 
governance of disease containment stands perpetually on the brink of 
running, quite literally, ‘out of control’ – and not only biologically.  
As Pretty42 asks in the context of animal disease, “within scientific 
disciplines, uncertainty is an accepted norm ...[ ]... Yet how does this 
dynamic translate as the evidence rock is pushed towards the Sisyphean 
policy summit, or across to the public and media? Do policy makers and the 
public want evidence couched with uncertainties and probabilities? Or do 
they want simple answers?”  This paper has sought to develop a framework 
for thinking constructively and critically about the way these uncertainties 
can be handled for animal disease containment.   
One plausible response to uncertainty is to redouble commitments to 
resolving inadequacies in relevant knowledge. This may mean enhancing 
precautionary measures within containment, for instance, investing in 
technical monitoring instruments of new filtration plants for public water 
supplies to anticipate better the occurrence of zoonotic waterborne 
pathogens such as Cryptosporidium, or to pre-empt ignorance and lack of 
downstream control by imposing more restrictive measures on animal 
movements and traceability to reduce the probability of the spread of FMD.  
Alternatively, it may mean experimenting in potentially paradigm-shifting 
innovations, such as through the introduction of novel technologies like 
faster and more precise diagnostics, new vaccines, or improved 
epidemiological modelling.   
Important though these efforts are, a key facet must also be ‘learning to 
live with’ systems that remain open (in relation to inadequate knowledge of 
them, or intrinsically) and contingent in character, that is, systems with 
great capacity for unanticipated consequences and surprises.  In the 
development of animal disease containment strategies there is a need to 
recognise the essential creativity of complex hybrid behavioural systems in 
evading prediction and control.  Two implications of this are: a need for 
appropriately distributed, as distinct from concentrated knowledge, agency 
and responsibility; and a readiness to acknowledge the essential contingency 
of any expert knowledge, so that it can be open to supplementary 
knowledges from salient other quarters. Neither of these is easily 
accommodated in typical institutional settings of science and policy, in any 
domain43.    
Acknowledging that there are by-definition incalculable ignorances and 
indeterminacies that affect applications of scientific knowledge in disease 
containment, and building this into policy process design, does not mean 
abandoning policy to ignorance.  It does however mean opening all such 
bodies of expert knowledge to question as to often hidden and taken-for-
granted framing premises, which other bodies of knowledge, including non-
scientific specialist (such as livestock experts – known as farmers), or social 
scientific research knowledge of relevant practices, may then be able to 
improve, or even correct.     
Enabling policy actors to be alert to, and reflexive about, these inevitable 
shortcomings demands cross disciplinary work at the interfaces of different 
disciplinary and policy discourse-practice, and across different arenas of 
containment.  The framework  developed here is designed to enable this 
process:  the basis for more formalised  and robust analysis of where 
uncertainty may exist and hence assist in highlighting areas where greater, 
cross-disciplinary effort might actually lead to a better containment policy. 
To what extent current framings of natural and social scientific knowledge in 
disease containment policy can accommodate this is debatable.  The use of 
different types of natural and social science within strategies of containment 
is highly asymmetric, with disease modelling and economics arguably 
providing dominant policy framings of each, respectively. Moreover the 
relationship between natural and social science is also asymmetric, such that 
the former do not simply inform policy, but far more significantly, in effect 
end up by default defining the policy issues. For example scientific models, 
taken to be representations of only natural systems, reflect tacit 
commitments to what factors are taken as beyond policy influence, and what 
are feasible (or desirable) points of policy intervention44 . The associated 
tendency for policy to elaborate technical instruments  instead of considering 
appropriate institutional changes which could help cultivate a policy culture 
more open to contingencies and lack-of-(predictive)-control, has been 
discussed for risk management contexts, by Wynne.1  In the UK, dimensions 
of how government may enable this culture through broader and deeper 
platform of social research are now emerging45. 
Recognising and working effectively with these different qualities of 
calculable and incalculable uncertainties in  animal disease containment thus 
depends on re-thinking some central  assumptions about the role of natural 
and social sciences in real world policy design.. This is not only a question of 
cross-disciplinary relations, but crucially, of the readiness of policy cultures 
to develop and enact new interdisciplinary understandings of the roles of 
knowledge, uncertainty, and inherent limits of intellectual control, in realistic 
and credible policy practice.   
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